The ROK-Japan Stalemate
South Korea and Japan are key U.S partners in the Indo Pacific, yet their concerns seemingly run parallel to one another, leading to frictions in bilateral relations. Interviews cited are conducted by the author.
While the Quadrilateral Dialogue (QUAD) dominates the political discourse in the Indo-Pacific region, middle powers in the region have surfaced as key players. As democracies in the region, the two Asian nations, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan are expected to become closer, and yet the drama that entails the release of the latest Japanese White Paper says otherwise. Bilateral talks between the ROK and Japan were expected to commence during the South Korean President, Moon Jae In’s visit to Tokyo during the 2021 Olympics. However, Moon’s administration rejected the invitation stating that no satisfactory discussion would come about. The stalemate between the two is of course not out of the blue.
Unkempt History
South Korean history is marred with countless Japanese invasions, and the annexation of the Korean peninsula in 1910 has left a permanent scar. Like all colonial masters, the Japanese Imperialists did not hold back on inflicting any atrocity to the Korean people. With the defeat of Japan in 1945, the Korean peninsula sought its liberation. In South Korea, August 15th is celebrated as “Gwangbokjeol” meaning ‘the day the light returned’, which also symbolises their rich history of nationhood.
In December 1965, South Korean President Park Chung Hee signed the Basic agreement with Japan, which led to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Over the years, people-to-people interaction and economic exchanges increased. However, colonial legacy remained a key area of friction between the two countries, which continue to bedevil their relationship. While Japan asserts that it has repatriated and made remunerations for its past actions regarding forced labour and “comfort women”, it remains a point of contention. South Korea’s Supreme Court has made frequent rulings over the years on the need for Japan to compensate the plaintiffs (forced labourers and comfort women).
In 2015, a healing and reconciliation fund was set up jointly by Japan on the contentious issue of “comfort women”. However, disagreements on the matter led the South Korean President, Moon Jae’s Administration to eventually dismantle this fund. Then Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, warned that this could lead to a disturbance in the South Korea-Japan relations. Despite statements from Japan, Moon Jae In’s government implemented this decision. The then Japanese Foreign Minister Kono Taro in a press release demanded South Korea to reinstate the fund for comfort women to sustain normalcy in ties with Japan. Japanese politicians visiting Yasukuni Shrine only indicate them as an unrepentant occupying power for the South Korean public. The Japanese government, on the other hand, has been urging South Korea not to get stuck in the past for the sake of fostering trust between the two countries.
Subsequently, South Korea-Japan relations remain hostage to the colonial memories. According to Jagannath Panda, “although there have been some discussions over these sore spots, with South Korean courts dismissing forced labour cases against Japanese companies in June 2021, the compensation issue remains a source of tension in bilateral ties and fuels hostility amongst both publics. More importantly, these wartime frictions have extended to regular diplomatic spats, trade tensions and contentions in the maritime domain.” According to Tam Sang Huynh, historical tensions between the two countries will remain hostage to the “strong nationalistic political discourse in both countries. This is evident through their official communication, and media speculations continue to add to these tensions.” Dr Rahul Mishra believes that issues between ROK and Japan are “emotive rather than strategic.” He also emphasises that Japan is a major power in the Indo-Pacific region while South Korea remains a middle power, so this cannot be overlooked while assessing their foreign policies and bilateral relations.
Moreover, the Dokdo islands that Japan refers to as Takeshima remains a bone of contention between the two Asian powers. It complicates the maritime and airspace boundaries as well as the exclusive economic zones (layers of further complexity to the issue are added with China’s additional claims to the region) for the two countries that have resulted in further friction. This conflict stretches towards the names attributed to the body of water that separates South Korea and Japan, commonly known as the Sea of Japan or the East Sea. South Korea has asserted that either this water body is termed as the East Sea or include both countries in the name.
Bilateral Relations amidst Geopolitics of the Indo Pacific
While geopolitical analysts emphasise the importance of the Japan-US-ROK trilateral, ROK’s diplomatic relevance to Japan seems to be fading. The White Paper released by Japan in 2021 largely focuses on upping security measures against China and bridging Taiwan’s security with its own. The paper ruffled feathers in Seoul, seeing Japanese assertiveness in defining its boundaries, especially with Dokdo/Takeshima. These tensions further aggravated with the Tokyo Olympics map that counted disputed islets as part of Japan’s territory; In the Pyeongchang Olympics, South Korea had revised its map as Japan demanded, yet Japan is unwilling to show similar flexibility towards South Korea’s demands.
According to Dr Jagannath Panda, Japan has likely taken offence to Moon Jae In’s cancellation of the 2015 agreement on comfort women, “which has prevented Tokyo from rebuilding trust and pursuing a rapprochement in the Indo-Pacific decade.” For Hyunh, the Japanese Prime Minister Suga “will not take a risk” in stepping up relations with ROK “seeing the public reaction towards the former Prime Minister Abe, who was perceived to be more lenient, and after all foreign policy is an extension of the domestic policy.”
The bilateral relations are also likely strained due to ROK’s hesitant stance on connecting with the QUAD+ framework. Certainly, the U.S expects to solidify its postures in the region with the help of allies like ROK and Japan. ROK is moving ahead with its “foreign policy autonomy and to somewhat imprint its own national identity amid big powers (US-China), so it is very hard for Seoul to pick and choose sides,” as Hyunh puts it.
For ROK, its ‘lukewarm’ stance on QUAD+ comes from its need to maintain engagement with China on two fronts. Firstly, China remains an economic giant in the region and South Korea has felt the impact of Chinese sanctions on the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) episode and is yet to recover from these. Dr Panda argues that “concerns over how joining an expanded Quad framework will affect Seoul’s relations with Beijing, making Seoul hesitant. Further, while the Quad/Quad-Plus is looking at decoupling from China, Seoul likely does not view it as a right fit for its national interests.”
Dr Mishra adds that the phenomenon of QUAD itself took ten years to formulate, so the process towards QUAD+ is likely to be gradual as well. Unlike the Cold War era, “the strategic dynamics is still fluid. China is an integral part of regional economic processes and supply chain mechanisms. It is a predominant player in both Northeast and Southeast Asian economic landscapes. The Korean peninsula, in particular, has both China and the US as key stakeholders.”
Secondly, Moon Jae In’s vision is to solidify peaceful talks with his North Korean counterpart. Tensions between the two have had their ebb and flow. Hyunh understands that for ROK to maintain its bilateral ties with China offers a mediating ground with North Korea. It wants to utilise China’s leverage on North Korea.
Although the U.S-ROK alliance has moved more towards progressive grounds, as we see the Biden Administration involving South Korea in major discussions globally, yet the U.S expects more action in the Indo-Pacific from its ally. However, South Korea is likely to maintain its policy of “strategic ambiguity” as an essential tenet and surviving toolkit amidst the flux of geopolitics in the region. President Moon Jae In can move closer to the U.S if China’s aggression is unbearable, but Hyunh notes “China is smart and will not let a country out of its influence so soon.”
And yet if ROK does actively pursue the U.S policy on decoupling China, it is likely to ferment the American campaign of democracies, alongside Japan, working to preserve the rules-based order and as Dr Panda suggests, “it would also come as a strong signal of the limits of Beijing’s economic prowess in coercing states, and could potentially encourage other regional powers to resist Chinese economic coercion.” Dr Mishra sees ROK embracing its strategic ambiguity policy as long as relations between U.S-China do not lead to a Cold war 2.0.
Prospects of Better Relations in the Greater Indo Pacific Dynamics
ROK and Japan are two key democracies in Asia, and increasingly becoming favourites for the Biden Administration. On cooperation between the two within the Indo Pacific paradigm, Dr Mishra argues that “so far, the Japan-South Korean relations are not much influenced by the Indo-Pacific dynamics. Their bilateral ties will not have much impact on the US policies and practices. We have witnessed it in the past.”
However, “their understanding is crucial for the U.S cooperation based on a ‘ hub and spoke’ framework to materialise effectively against China”, as Hyunh puts it. There are overlapping concerns for Japan and South Korea in the region like countering Chinese marine coercion, dealing with issues of human trafficking, regulation of Covid, and most importantly enhancing their status as reliable partners to Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries as well as the U.S. Dr Panda emphasises that “as neighbouring states sharing a security alliance with the US, repairing their relations is critical to improving stability in East Asia,” including their engagement vis-a-vis North Korea and China.
Is this leap towards better bilateral relations coming any sooner? Neither ROK nor Japan is willing to budge from their stated stances. The baggage of history dominates their contemporary relations and is likely to translate into regional geopolitics, which could create unexpected anomalies for the U.S. Will the U.S effectively mitigate these tensions as a mediator still needs to be seen. Their collaboration is largely leaning on the U.S and remains obstructed due to bilateral wariness. Till then the two Asian middle powers are likely to stay embroiled in their nationalistic fervour, hoping for better gains nationally and globally.
The author is currently a Research Associate at Global Village Space and has interned at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad. Her interests include the geopolitics of the Indo Pacific and Eurasia. She tweets @JavairyahAatif.
