From Sakura to Samurai: Japan’s Russia Problem
Japan sanctions Russia, and Russia abandons peace talks on disputed territories…#Geopolitics.
Japan’s pacifist foreign policy has kept it out of external conflicts for years, but the Russian invasion of Ukraine has led the Japanese to involve itself in the European theatre by supplying military equipment, and while Tokyo has no intention to join the war head-on, it has been leading the charge of sanctions against Russia together with the west, with the most urgency. This is also exemplified through Kishida’s visit to New Delhi recently where he emphasised the need for India to use whatever leverage it has on Moscow to help cease this conflict and to stand with Ukrainian sovereignty.
Earlier in 2021, When the newly elected Japanese leader Fumio Kishida was in a 25-minute conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin, it seemed as if Japan’s Russia problem just might clampdown. The initial calls at this stage for any country determine its outlook in foreign policy and Kishida’s administration seemed to pursue the possibility of negotiations between the two countries to resolve existing conflicts. But then came 2022, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which only proves to Japan that Russia will not back down on its claims over the Northern territories/islands also called the islands of southern Kuril Chain.
Ever since the end of world war 2, the two countries have had a sour relationship due to their claims on four islands in the Kuril chain, namely Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and Habomai. These disputes mainly stem from the disagreements and loopholes in the treaties related to it. The situation became more complex when constitutional reforms in Russia were passed banning any sort of territorial concessions, which then contradicts the spirit of the 1956 treaty between the two countries. Moscow and Tokyo have more than just bilateral tensions to worry about. Japan itself may not pose a problem to Russia, but its alliance with the United States that has intensified over the years, along with its opposition to China may very well impact how Moscow perceives the East Asian nation. For Russia returning these islands to Tokyo would mark a blow to its prestige and a sign of weakness. This makes the future of the Northern Territories even more complicated given how Tokyo has been powerless in curbing Russian militarization of the islands in question.
What adds more to these tensions for Japan is the “Dragonbear”, a modus vivendi between China and Russia that aims to develop a systemic counterweight to the United States as the global order undergoes bifurcation. Japan has openly subscribed to the West-led “values-based” world order and is also leading the front with the West to contain China in the Indo-Pacific. In any case, aggression coming from Russia or China towards Japan will display the Dragonbear synergy as is happening in Ukraine. While Ukraine is ravaged by war, the US-led West has not achieved much on the negotiations table even if Europe stands united now more than ever. This can push Japan to consider constitutional changes in its defence posture and to not solely rely on US surety and guarantees in case of any aggression posed by Russia or any other country in the region. Japan’s shift from Sakuras to Samurais is then well justified given current geopolitical realities.
